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ABSTRACT In this study, we reconsider the classical positive association between the level of
market uncertainty and an organization’s propensity to form ties with organizations of similar
status. Although prior research argues that the greater the uncertainty, the higher the level of
status homophily, we suggest that this relationship is contingent upon framing that affects
positive or negative valence towards uncertainty. In an up market, organizations tend to frame
uncertainty as upside risk, and thus will subsequently favour explorative uncertainty-mitigation
devices; whereas, in a down market, organizations primarily frame uncertainty as downward
risk, and thus will rely on more conservative uncertainty-mitigation mechanisms. We therefore
predict that a greater number of status-heterophilous ties will be formed in an up market than
in a down market. We discuss the implications of our results for status theory and more
broadly for research on strategic decision making under uncertainty.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty has been widely documented as a driving force behind the formation of
inter-organizational ties (Auster, 1992; Beckman et al., 2004; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978). In research on strategic alliances, for instance, empirical studies suggest that
organizations facing environmental uncertainty will partner with other organizations
in an effort to share risks and acquire knowledge (Gulati, 1995a; Kogut, 1991; Luo,
1997). However, selecting an alliance partner represents a challenge in itself. Informa-
tion regarding potential partners is highly valued but scarce and costly to obtain
(Nohria, 1992); therefore, a key concern is to reduce uncertainty relative to potential
partners’ capabilities (Kogut, 1988) and trustworthiness (Gulati, 1995a). To cope with
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this dearth of information, market actors can rely on cues found in the surrounding
social structure (Beckert, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meuleman et al., 2010;
Podolny, 1994).
Status constitutes one type of social cues that organizations can rely upon when
selecting an alliance partner. The status of an organization can be defined as the prestige
and recognition derived from its position in a hierarchical social structure (Gould, 2002;
Podolny, 2005; Washington and Zajac, 2005). Actors who possess discriminating status-
valued characteristics (Ridgeway and Berger, 1986) have been shown to enjoy significant
privileges (Gould, 2002).
Based on the assumption that quality is to some extent positively related to status,
status cues can discriminate among organizations when quality is difficult to observe
(Podolny, 2005). Podolny (2001) highlights the role of interorganizational relationships as
status signals and conceptualizes these relationships as ‘prisms’ through which external
audiences perceive a focal organization. According to this prism perspective, observers
infer an organization’s intrinsic quality from the status of the organizations it is con-
nected to (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 2001; Washington and Zajac, 2005)
because the willingness of others to associate with the focal organization provides a
means for evaluating its unobservable characteristics (Podolny, 1994; Podolny and
Phillips, 1996).
An important claim of this relational view of status is that the manifest transfer
of resources (i.e. goods or services) is associated with a latent transfer of status between
partners (Podolny and Phillips, 1996; Stuart et al., 1999). The formation of a
relationship between a high-status actor and a low-status actor thus results in a loss of
status for the former and a gain for the latter (Podolny, 1994, 2005). As a consequence,
status anxiety – that is, the fear of being devalued because other market actors
within the field doubt the quality of one’s partners ( Jensen, 2006) – leads organizations
to enter and maintain relationships with partners of similar status (Chung et al.,
2000; Podolny, 1994; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008), a phenomenon known as status
homophily.
Prior research has shown that the value granted to status signals depends on the level
of market uncertainty confronted by organizations. In the face of market uncertainty,
which cannot be controlled by a single organization (Beckman et al., 2004), the com-
plexity of the partner-selection process increases and the social structural position of
potential partners is used as a signal of quality. Consequently, the higher this uncertainty,
the greater the importantce of status, and the greater the inclination of organizations to
form homophilous ties (Podolny, 1994). As demonstrated in recent studies, however,
certain conditions can override this inclination to form homophilous ties. For instance,
high-status organizations may be willing to initiate ties with organizations of lower status
when they believe they can extract greater effort and commitment from low-status
partners (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010) or when they expect heterophilous ties to yield
informational benefits (Shipilov et al., 2011). Building on these studies, and in contrast to
prior research on status that posits a linear relationship between market uncertainty and
the value of status signals as substitutes to unobservable quality, we propose a more
nuanced vision of the classical positive association between the level of market uncer-
tainty and an organization’s propensity to form homophilous ties. Specifically, we argue
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that the value of status signals varies, depending upon the context in which organizations
are embedded.
We advance research on the contingent nature of decision-making processes, and, in
particular, upon works showing how context can differentially channel attention and
decision making (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012; Ocasio, 1997,
2011; Sullivan, 2010), by showing that different market conditions frame the percep-
tion of the relative value of status signals and therefore influence the type of relation-
ships organizations initiate (i.e. homophilous versus heterophilous ties). We consider
two market conditions to study the alliance partner–selection process: an up market,
dominated by an emphasis on upside risk (i.e. where uncertainty is framed in terms of
potential opportunities), and a downward market, where downside risk prevails (i.e.
where uncertainty is framed in terms of possible losses). We propose that in up
markets, organizations primarily focus on not missing good partnerships and pay less
attention to status cues in their partner-selection process, while in downward markets,
organizations are mostly concerned with avoiding initiating ties with unworthy part-
ners and therefore rely heavily on status cues as their primary uncertainty-mitigation
device. As a consequence, we expect status homophily to be relatively higher in down-
ward markets than in up markets. In addition, we predict that even in the face of
increased market uncertainty, this difference in organizations’ propensity to engage in
or, on the contrary, to refrain from, initiating heterophilous ties will hold and even
increase. Our empirical analyses provide support for our conjectures that different
framings of uncertainty affect the relative importance of status in alliance-formation
processes.
We test our hypotheses in the context of alliance formation in the software industry
during the period 1996 to 2002. The software industry provides a particularly inter-
esting empirical setting because it comprises two very distinct up market and down
market phases. From the mid-1990s until the middle of 2000, the market followed a
strong upward trend fuelled by the diffusion of computer network technology to a large
audience (Cassidy, 2002). This first period has been dubbed ‘the internet bubble’ or
‘the dot-com bubble’, and was heralded, at the time, as the start of a ‘new economy’,
free from traditional economic cycles. Although most internet firms never became
profitable, many that pursued initial public offerings were highly successful. This first
expansionary period was followed by a phase of contraction, during which numerous
firms collapsed and investors incurred substantial losses. Thus, this empirical setting
provides a site to test actors’ responses to exceptional levels of market uncertainty,
during both the speculative up market phase and the steep down market period that
followed.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on the
relationship between status homophily and market uncertainty. We then discuss how
contextual elements and their subsequent framing may affect the level of status
homophily and its relationship with market uncertainty, from which we derive testable
hypotheses. After analysing our data on the software industry, we present and elaborate
on our findings. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications
and contributions of our study to research on status and on decision-making under
uncertainty.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Uncertainty and Status Homophily
Uncertainty is a central concept in organizational theory (March and Simon, 1958). At
the organizational level, uncertainty, defined as the ‘difficulty firms have in predicting the
future, which comes from incomplete knowledge’ (Beckman et al., 2004, p. 260), char-
acterizes situations where actors cannot anticipate or predict future states of the world
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Under conditions of uncertainty, imperfect information
prevents actors from knowing how to behave and what to expect from their environment
(Hogg and Terry, 2000). Such uncertainty, which cannot be controlled by any direct
organizational action, is termed ‘market uncertainty’ (Beckman et al., 2004, p. 262).
Market uncertainty is shared by all organizations within a given field and encompasses
a wide range of issues, such as instability in consumer demands for products and services
or increased levels of industry concentration. To mitigate this uncertainty, organizations
may seek to establish partnerships with other actors (Auster, 1992; Beckman et al., 2004;
Gulati, 1995a; Luo, 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Although associating with an exchange partner might enable an organization to
mitigate some effects of market uncertainty, selecting the appropriate alliance partner is
itself a challenging and critical issue. Because organizations might not be able to effec-
tively evaluate potential partners prior to a collaboration, a key issue in the selection
process is to reduce uncertainty relative to the potential partners’ capabilities (Kogut,
1988) and trustworthiness (Gulati, 1995a). Organizations willing to mitigate this selection
uncertainty will turn to their surrounding social structures to seek cues (Haunschild,
1994; Podolny, 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1983) that will enable them to make
decisions by substituting ‘simpler judgmental operations’ for ‘complex tasks of assessing
probabilities and predicting values’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 p. 1124). As amply
demonstrated in prior research (e.g. Podolny, 2005), when information is scarce or is
overabundant and noisy, organizations rely heavily on status signals as cues to evaluate
the quality of potential partners’ output. Status can be defined as the amount of prestige,
recognition, and privilege granted to an organization given its position in a hierarchical
social structure (Gould, 2002; Podolny, 2005; Washington and Zajac, 2005).
In recent years, a substantial stream of research has explored the dynamics underlying
status-based stratifications. Status-based models of market competition posit that because
market actors can derive significant benefits from an incremental increase in status (Park
and Podolny, 2000), they will engage in behaviours that maintain or enhance their own
status. According to a fundamental claim of this stream of research, in a market-
exchange relationship, the manifest transfer of resources (i.e. goods or services) is asso-
ciated with a latent transfer of status between exchange partners ( Jensen, 2004; Podolny
and Phillips, 1996; Stuart et al., 1999). Organizational fields are thus relationally nego-
tiated orders where an organization’s status position is contingent on the status of its
affiliates (Podolny and Phillips, 1996), and status dynamics are traditionally explained in
terms of changes in an organization’s pattern of market ties (Podolny, 2001; Podolny
and Phillips, 1996). A central concern has thus been to investigate the impact on status
of affiliating with others. For instance, in their study of the US intercollegiate post-
season basketball tournament, Washington and Zajac (2005) documented this ‘leaking’
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characteristic of status by suggesting both that status evolution is a function of the
accumulation of positive and negative associations, and that status can be transferred
through both cooperative and competitive relationships. They find that, regardless of a
team’s performance during the game, competing with high-status schools enhances a
team’s status, while competing with low-status schools erodes status.
As evidenced in the above-mentioned study, when organizations with dissimilar status
positions share a tie, the higher-status organizations suffer from status erosion, while their
lower-status partners experience status growth (Podolny, 1994; Podolny and Phillips,
1996). As a consequence, an affiliation can lead to an alteration of the privileges afferent
to a particular status position. Because of ‘status anxiety’ ( Jensen, 2006), organizations
are thus reluctant to associate with lower-status counterparts and instead tend to adopt
a principle of exclusivity in their partner-selection process. That is, they elect to engage
in relationships with organizations of approximately similar status, a phenomenon
known as status homophily (Chung et al., 2000; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987;
McPherson et al., 2001; Podolny, 1994; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008). Thus, a central
assumption of status research is that the greater the market uncertainty, the greater
organizations’ reliance on status signals to make decisions, and, subsequently, the greater
the likelihood that these organizations will initiate status homophilous ties (Podolny,
1994).
Only recently have scholars challenged this assumption, showing that, in certain
conditions, status-based heterophilous ties may be preferred over homophilous ties. For
instance, in their study of the Formula One industry, Castellucci and Ertug (2010) build
on the idea that organizations are willing to pay a tribute in exchange for status gains and
find that high-status racing teams can therefore secure greater efforts from low-status
engine suppliers than from engine suppliers of similar status. This extraction of greater
efforts, in turn, confers a positive effect on team performance. Similarly, Shipilov et al.
(2011) argue that some organizations are more likely than others to build heterophilous
ties. For example, an organization that occupies a brokerage position within a network
(i.e. bridging otherwise unconnected partners) is more likely than others to initiate status
heterophilous ties, but only when its achieved performance exceeds its own performance
aspirations. Initiating heterophilous ties allows this organization to extract higher tribute
from its lower-status partners or to reduce its own tribute extended to its higher-status
associates. Thus, in some occasions, organizations may consider the loss of status engen-
dered by their associations with lower-status partners to be amply compensated by the
benefits extracted as a result of the association.
In this paper, we build on these studies to reconsider the classical positive associa-
tion between the level of market uncertainty and an organization’s propensity to
favour homophilous ties. However, our perspective differs from these studies in
one fundamental way. We do not explain the propensity of some organizations to
engage in status-heterophilous ties as being motivated solely by the search for
organizational benefits but as the consequence of the framing of the context in which
these organizations are embedded. The theoretical underpinning for our central claim
is the proposition that different market conditions focus organizations’ attention on
different types of concerns, thus affecting their propensity to form status-homophilous
ties.
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Environmental Conditions, Differentiated Framings,
and Status Homophily
Environmental conditions and strategic decisions. Organizations’ decisions and behaviours are
shaped by the issues and concerns they focus on. Actors can use different frames, or
‘schemata of interpretation’, to help make sense of events and occurrences (Goffman,
1974; Snow et al., 1986). The selective encoding of elements (Williams and Benford,
2000) leads actors to attend more acutely to particular issues (Fiss and Zajac, 2006),
thereby affecting their decision-making process.
A central postulate of several streams of research in organization theory is the
reference-dependent nature of actors’ behaviours. With a particular focus on risk-taking
and risk-reduction behaviours, research inspired by the behavioural theory of the firm
(Argote and Greve, 2007; Cyert and March, [1963] 1992; Gavetti et al., 2007; Greve,
1999, 2003; Shinkle, 2012) has shown that the discrepancy between the level of perfor-
mance actors aspire to achieve and their actual achieved performance frames and guides
their strategic behaviour. In a similar fashion, works that build on strategic reference
point theory (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1986, 1988; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Shoham
and Fiegenbaum, 2002), which is largely inspired by prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), suggest that actors are risk-averse when
their performance is above a reference point, but tend to be risk-taking when their
performance falls short of this reference point. These responses are partly due to actors’
tendency to frame issues as threats when their performance exceeds their reference point,
and as opportunities when their performance fails to meet their reference point (Shinkle,
2012).
These streams of research have deepened our understanding of the contingent nature
of decision-making processes; however, less is known about the role of the external
environment in the framing and shaping of organizational behaviour. As recently sug-
gested by researchers who contribute to the behavioural theory of the firm, future
research should therefore ‘elaborate further the impact of situational context on decision
making to account for a number of variables, including decision framing’ (Gavetti et al.,
2007, p. 532).
Consistent with this call, ‘neo-Carnegie’ attention-based research shows that the
particular contexts actors find themselves in can differentially focus and shape their
attention and decision making (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012;
Ocasio, 1997, 2011; Sullivan, 2010).[1] Gulati and Higgins (2003), for instance, propose
that the uncertainty faced by investors is framed differently, depending on the
favourability of equity markets. In a similar vein, behavioural finance research shows that
market directions can be construed as frames shaping actors’ behaviours (Docking and
Koch, 2005). Docking and Koch show that investors’ positive reaction to financial
performance that exceeds expectations is amplified when the market is volatile and
moving upward, whereas negative reactions to results that fall short of expectations
are magnified when the market is volatile and moving downward. We build on these
findings to investigate the extent to which organizations’ emphasis on status signals in
their partner-selection process is framed by the market conditions these organizations
confront.
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Prior research has defined uncertainty as the variance in the distribution of potential
outcomes, arguing that it may manifest in terms of upside risk (i.e. uncertainties that can
have positive outcomes) or downside risk (i.e. uncertainties that can have negative
outcomes) (March and Shapira, 1987; Miller and Leiblein, 1996; Miller and Reuer,
1996; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000). Based on this distinction, we consider two types of
market conditions for studying the partner-selection process: an up market, character-
ized by upside risk, and a down market, where downside risk prevails.
The selection of an alliance partner entails two main concerns for the partner-seeking
organization: the failure to notice valuable partners and, on the contrary, the selection of
low-value partners. Although both concerns likely affect any partner-selection process,
we suggest that partner-seeking organizations will tend to focus on, and therefore attend
to, one concern or the other, depending on whether market conditions are upward or
downward. In high-growth, expansionary phases (up markets), where products and
services are expected to ‘sell like hot cakes’, organizations channel their attention towards
identifying the most promising developments. Because upside risk prevails in up markets,
opportunities are positively valenced (i.e. they are framed as being attractive), typically
leading organizations to engage in exploration and trial-and-error processes. Failures are
thus likely to be perceived as having limited consequences for an organization’s future.
As a result, during expansionary phases, organizations will be less concerned by the risk
of selecting the wrong partners and will, instead, tend to engage in developing partner-
ships that are promising, although uncertain. In such contexts, organizations will seek to
build new and diverse ties in an effort to access novel resources and knowledge, even
when the prospects of some alliances may be doubtful (see Burt, 2005 for a synthetic
argument on vision; see also Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004, 2008; Powell et al., 2005).
The expected benefits that can be extracted from these new and diverse ties are likely to
defuse, at least in part, the status anxiety ( Jensen, 2006) that these organizations may
experience (Shipilov et al., 2011).
By contrast, in a contractive phase (a down market), when market confidence is
damaged, organizations’ attention is primarily channelled towards not making bad
deals. Because downside risk prevails, opportunities are negatively valenced (i.e. they
are framed as being unattractive). Organizations thus tend to have ‘cold feet’ and
refocus their investments to activities whose benefits can be easily measured and
observed, in an effort to avoid a poor allocation of their resources. Organizations no
longer have the incentive of forming ties outside their status bracket for the purpose of
building a diverse set of relationships. Instead, they will rely on established formulas
and players, which are seen as providing a refuge. A central concern becomes the
potential damage that may be caused by an association with actors that have been
significantly affected by the downturn. Thus, status signals are likely to be used to
reduce the uncertainty surrounding the evaluation of potential partners. Further, status
anxiety typically runs high, further reinforcing the effect of status in the formation of
an alliance.
We therefore propose that, all things being equal (i.e. given similar levels of market
uncertainty), organizations will grant higher value to status signals in down markets than
in up markets. As a consequence, we should observe a higher level of status homophily
in the down markets than in up markets. Hence, the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The level of status homophily in alliance formation is lower in an up
market than in a down market.
Level of Market Uncertainty and Status Homophily
Prior research on status-based models of market interactions posits that the higher the
uncertainty confronted by actors, the greater these actors’ reliance on status signals as
substitutes for reliable information, and, therefore, the more likely they are to initiate
status-homophilous ties (Podolny, 1993, 2005). We suggest that this underlying assump-
tion of status research needs to be qualified and that the positive relationship between
market uncertainty and status homophily is contingent on the market conditions con-
fronted by organizations. By extending Hypothesis 1, which predicts that, at constant
levels of uncertainty, organizations embedded in up market conditions should initiate
fewer status-homophilous ties than organizations embedded in downward market con-
ditions, we argue that these differences should hold and may even be reinforced when the
level of market uncertainty varies.
In a down market, organizations will react to a rise in the level of market uncertainty
by relying heavily on status signals when selecting an exchange partner. In such con-
tractive phases, organizations are primarily concerned with entering into relationships
with reliable partners; that is, organizations seek partners that will deliver on quality and
will not send negative signals to their audiences. Higher levels of market uncertainty in
a down market will not only amplify status anxiety but also increase organizations’
vulnerability to environmental variations. Because partnering with lower-status actors
incurs higher advertising, transaction, and financial costs (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990;
Podolny, 1993), initiating status heterophilous ties increases the vulnerability of higher-
status organizations. In such contexts, status signals will therefore constitute valuable
uncertainty-reduction mechanisms, and a rise in the level of market uncertainty will
likely trigger the posited classical increase in the formation of homophilous ties.
In contrast, we predict that, in an up market, status signals (even when they continue
to play a role in the partner-selection process) will be less attended to by organizations
facing rising levels of market uncertainty. In such a context, identifying promising
opportunities supersedes other concerns, leading to numerous strategies that may carry
some downside risks being considered as adequate for two reasons. First, as evidenced by
abundant research in strategy and network theory, forming new and diverse ties, inde-
pendent of status, is a valuable way of coping with uncertainty and the constraints of
dependency on others (Beckman et al., 2004; Gargiulo, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978). Forming ties with new players provides an opportunity for learning about new
practices and technologies (Baum et al., 2003; Davis and Greve, 1997; Podolny et al.,
1996; Shipilov et al., 2011), thereby maximizing the probability that some partnerships
will be successful. Rather than seeking partnerships with organizations of similar status,
actors may be willing to form heterophilous ties in their effort to cope with rising levels
of market uncertainty. Second, the status of established players may be put into question,
as on some occasions, environmental changes may be associated with speculation regard-
ing the status of incumbents and therefore will create opportunities for actors to make
new types of status claims (Lounsbury, 2002). In expansionary phases, newcomers may
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attempt to challenge established status hierarchies by substituting new status signals for
the existing ones. For these reasons, a rise in the level of market uncertainty should not
trigger the expected increase in the formation of homophilous ties and may even increase
the initiation of heterophilous ties. We thus make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A rise in market uncertainty will lead to a rise in status homophily in
alliance formation that is more accentuated in a down market than in an up market.
METHODS
Empirical Context and Data
We test our hypotheses in the software industry, where status signals are likely to play a
role in the formation of strategic alliances between software organizations. The software
industry is based on a series of successive innovations that generate a complex and
changing technological ecosystem, making quality evaluations difficult (Campbell-Kelly,
1995, 2004; Cusumano, 2003, 2004). As a consequence, status signals may provide useful
information for the process of selecting alliance partners. We collected data on software
organizations tracked in the Dow Jones Global Software Index, which covers 95 per cent
of the market capitalizations of software organizations. For the 216 publicly traded global
software organizations included in the Dow Jones Global Software index, we collected
financial data from Thomson One Banker, US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) filings, and Canadian Security Administrators for the period 1996–2002 and
collected data on alliances from SDC and Factiva (Lavie, 2007).
In the software industry, the mid-1990s marked the rise of new technologies. The
diffusion of internet-related technologies to a wide range of applications (e.g.
e-commerce and e-mail) generated uncertainty in the software industry for two reasons.
First, these technologies were ‘disruptive’ for incumbents (Christensen, 1997;
Christensen et al., 2002). For example, the new Java programming language may not
have run as fast as the previous C++ technology used by many incumbents but provided
attributes that made it relevant to internet applications at a performance level acceptable
to most users (Christensen, 2000; Christensen et al., 2002). Second, the uncertainty
generated by these technological transformations spurred a wave of speculative invest-
ments (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Ofek and Richardson, 2003) that exacerbated
the tendency of markets to evolve into what Keynes called a ‘beauty contest’ in which
actors ‘devote [their] intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the
average opinion to be’ (Keynes, [1936] 1958, chapter 12, p. 158). Mary Meeker, a
former Morgan Stanley security analyst, the author of The Internet Report, and a highly
influential internet security analyst, commented:
There is the same supply and demand imbalance [as during the Tulip bulb mania that
struck Holland in the early seventeenth century], the difference is that Tulip bulb
didn’t fundamentally change the way companies do business. The Internet does. But
when all is said and done there will be many stocks that in hindsight look like tulip-bulb
stories. (Cassidy, 1999, p. 51)
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The wave of investments into internet-related technology ended in mid-2000 (Cassidy,
2002), when many start-ups that had attracted large investments collapsed, subsequently
affecting the entire software industry. Figure 1 shows how the market, which was bullish
until the middle of 2000, reversed trends to become bearish towards the second half of
the year (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Ofek and Richardson, 2003). This figure also
shows that beyond the up-and-down, short-term market variations inherent to any
financial market, a very significant and much deeper trend reversal took place during this
period. This market duality (i.e. the bubble and subsequent crash) thus provides a
particularly interesting setting for investigating our research question.
Dependent and Independent Variables
Alliance formation. To test our hypotheses, we took a standard dyadic approach to alliance
formation (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), wherein, for
a given year, the dependent variable is the probability of an alliance between two
software organizations. The process of alliance formation is a matching process in which
the variables of both alliance partners interact. The variable thus takes the value 1 when
an alliance is observed and 0 otherwise.
Status similarity. We follow Jensen (2004) by using as our measure for status the amount
of sell-side analyst coverage. The evaluation of publicly traded organizations’ perfor-
mance is mediated by sell-side financial analysts, who have both privileged access to
organizations and sufficient time to process information. These analysts decide which
organizations are worthy of their attention, and their opinion significantly influences
other actors’ decisions (Brown, 1993; Groysberg, 2010; Groysberg et al., 2008;
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Womack, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999). Because high-status
organizations hold more prominence and greater visibility than their low-status peers
(Podolny, 1993), they usually command enormous attention from the media, the public,
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Figure 1. Dow Jones Software Index, 1994–2004
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and other actors, whereas their lower-status counterparts tend to be ignored (Goode,
1978; Gould, 2002). Financial analyst coverage is therefore consistent with a conception
of status as proportional to the amount of recognition an actor receives (Bonacich, 1987;
Bothner et al., 2010; Podolny, 2005) and provides a reliable sign of recognition by
intermediaries who shape audiences’ perception of an organization (Zuckerman, 1999).
In the context of this study, analyst coverage is preferred to an eigenvector centrality
measure of the position of an organization in the alliance network because our dependent
variable focuses on the formation of a single tie, whereas eigenvector centrality is a
function of the number of ties an organization has formed.
The data used to construct the measure of status come from the historical recommen-
dations database of the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). Because the extent
of coverage by industry analysts confers status to an organization independent of the
positive or negative nature of the coverage it receives, we considered a measure of an
organization’s status to be the number of reports and recommendations issued by
analysts during the three years prior to the analysed period. We thus obtained a score of
status for each organization in our sample and for each year within the observation
period. We refer to the extent to which two organizations are similar in status as status
similarity. Status similarity is operationalized as the ratio of the smaller status score to the
larger status score, in a dyad of potential alliance partners (Meuleman et al., 2010;
Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008).
Market uncertainty. Following Beckman et al. (2004), we use market volatility to measure
the extent of market uncertainty. We used data from the Dow Jones Software Index and
constructed our measure of volatility by calculating the mean monthly volatility of the
Dow Jones Software Index for each year.
Control Variables
Size. We included organizational size as a control in our models for two reasons. First,
although size and status refer to two different concepts, an organization’s size may partly
correlate to its status. Second, in the software industry, the utility of a product or service
increases with the number of its users, a property known as network externality
(Samuelson, 1951; Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Shy, 2001). As a result of
network externalities, the prospect of an alliance between two potential partners
increases as the size of their joint pool of clients grows. We take the sum of the total sales
of each pair of potential alliance partners as a proxy for the size of the organization.
Resources complementarity. This is a key driver in the formation of alliances (Gulati and
Gargulio, 1999; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Wang and Zajac, 2007). Prior research
has identified critical resources that enhance the probability of alliance formation
between two organizations, including financial resources, R&D resources, human
resources, and technological resources (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999; Gulati andWestphal,
1999; Gulati et al., 2009; Lavie, 2007; Powell et al., 2005). We collected data from
COMPUSTAT on cash funds for financial resources, R&D intensity for R&D resources, and
number of employees for human resources. These three resources complementarity
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variables are operationalized as the absolute value of the difference between the
resources of the dyad members. For technological resources complementarity, we built a vector
of binary variables tj that describes the subsectors in which each firm j operates. On the
basis of a review of industry classifications (i.e. from the US Census Bureau, the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Technology Obser-
vatory, and the International Data Corporation), we divided the industry into five
subsectors: user applications, databases, application development, system infrastructure,
and operating systems. For example, for a firm n that is involved in system infrastructures
and operating systems to the exclusion of other sections, its technology vector is
tn = (0,0,0,1,1). For a firm j that is involved in application development and system
infrastructure, its technology vector is tn = (0,0,1,1,0). Technological complementarity
between n and j is measured by the product ′ ⋅ ⋅t C tn j where C is a symmetric matrix of
dichotomous variables mapping complementary subsectors.[2] Because size is associated
with the number of subsectors in which an organization operates, the measure is
normalized to remove the effect of size, by dividing ′ ⋅ ⋅t C tn j by the Euclidian norm of tn
and tj.
Service orientation. In the software industry, two distinct activities coexist: product-oriented
activities and service-oriented activities (Campbell-Kelly, 1995, 2004; Cusumano, 2003,
2004). Consequently, we included in our models the service orientation of the dyad as an
additional control variable to take into account any potential difference in the incidence
of alliance formation. We used service orientation to refer to the extent to which an
organization’s business centres on the development and sales of software services, as
opposed to software products. In public disclosure documents, such as 10-K SEC filings,
software organizations report their sales using product and service categories. The
service orientation of an organization is therefore calculated as follows: for a firm selling
$70 million of services and $30 million of products, the service orientation is
70/(30 + 70) = 0.70. We thus define the service orientation of a dyad as the product of the
service orientation of both its organizations.
Network proximity. Organizations rely on their existing networks of alliance partners both
to access crucial information regarding the competencies and needs of potential partners
and to overcome the paucity of information regarding potential partners’ capabilities,
needs, and behaviours (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Gulati and Gargulio, 1999; Nohria, 1992).
As the distance increases between two organizations in the network of alliances, the
probability decreases that they will obtain information regarding each other. The dis-
tance between two organizations is measured as the number of steps separating the two
organizations in the alliance network. A network proximity variable is defined as the
inverse of distance. It takes the value 0 when no path exists. We followed previous studies
and used a five-year moving window to determine how far back prior alliances should be
considered relevant (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008). Because
little information is available on alliance duration, the model was also run with a
three-year window. Regression results are not dependent on the size of the moving
window.
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Alliance experience, geography, and media coverage. Organizations that have entered into multi-
ple alliances tend to use more effective ways to enter into new collaborations (Gulati and
Gargulio, 1999; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008). We therefore included an alliance experience
variable, operationalized as the product of the number of alliances entered into by each
of the two potential partners using the same three-year moving window used for the
network proximity variable. Although the software industry has historically been centred
in the United States, the formation of alliances may have a geographical dimension. A
dummy variable indicates whether two organizations are located in the same region (i.e.
Europe, Asia, or North America). The geography variable is set to 1 when the two members
of a dyad have their headquarters in the same region and 0 otherwise. The media coverage
of an organization may also influence the willingness of others to associate with it. We
measured media coverage by counting the number of articles in which a focal organi-
zation was mentioned during the previous year. Media coverage data for each organi-
zation were collected from Factiva.[3] The media coverage for a dyad was computed as
the product of the media coverage of the two organizations composing the dyad.
Statistical Model
To study the potential dyads that can enter an alliance each year, we followed a standard
dyad approach used in studies of tie formation (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999). Each
observation in our analysis describes a pair of organizations; the dependent variable of
interest (for the ij pair) is coded 1 when an alliance was formed between organization i
and organization j at time t, and 0 when an alliance was not formed. The number of
alliances formed relative to the total number of dyads is very small. Consequently, a
random sampling of dyads would yield downward-based estimates because the average
probability of alliance formation is small (0.008) (King and Zeng, 2001). Consequently,
we followed Sorenson and Stuart (2008) and used a conditional logit model, wherein
each (case + control) group is a stratum. A logistic regression model is specified for each
stratum:
π
α β
α βk kE Y
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e
k
k
x x
x
x
( ) = ( ) =
+
+
+
|
1
πk(x) is the conditional mean of our dependent variable Yk which takes the value 1 for the
case and 0 for the controls in the group; x is a vector of covariates, and αk is the
contribution of the logit of all terms constant within the strata (Hosmer and Lemeshow,
2000). Matched case–control sampling was done in the following way: for each observed
alliance, we selected randomly five control dyads in the same year, for which no alliance
occurred. Further increasing the number of control dyads would have only marginally
increased the efficiency of the estimates (Taylor, 1986). Because our controls are
matched on year, the value of volatility, our measure of market uncertainty, does not
vary from dyad to dyad within a (case + controls) stratum. Consequently, the main effect
of volatility is included in the intercepts of each stratum, and thus is not estimated.
To contrast the up market and down market, we split our sample into two sub-
samples. The first sub-sample represents the results for the period that preceded the
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crisis, up to the middle of 2000 (i.e. the bubble period). The second sub-sample repre-
sents the results for the time period that followed the crisis, until 2002 (i.e. the post-
bubble period). We prefer this method, which keeps the interpretation of the results
straightforward, over the alternative method of tracking the interaction of an up/down
market dummy variable with the interaction variable status similarity × market uncer-
tainty in a non-linear model.
RESULTS
Table I presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis for the whole dataset.
Table II presents the result of the regressions for the different models and is divided into
two parts: the first set of columns (Models 1 to 3) presents the results for the expansion
phase, and the second set of columns (Models 4 to 6) presents the results for the
contraction phase. Because the baseline probability of alliance formation between two
organizations is low (0.008), the odds ratios given by the conditional logistic regression
model are good approximations of probability ratios (Norton et al., 2004). For this
reason, we interpret our results in terms of probability ratios, which are more intuitive
than odds ratios. By contrast with marginal effects, probability ratios do not depend on
the value of other covariates (Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009).
Because the addition of variables does not modify the conclusions that can be drawn
from our models, we discuss directly Model 3 and Model 6. As expected, size has a
positive effect on the probability of alliance formation. One standard deviation of our size
variable for the dyad increases the probability of alliance formation by 5 per cent
(≈e1.018×0.05) in Model 3 (i.e. the up market) and 4 per cent in Model 6 (i.e. the down
market). Overall, the effect of size is small, which was not entirely unexpected. Large
organizations may indeed benefit from innovations originating in small organizations,
and small organizations may benefit from access to the larger organizations’ cash,
distribution, and marketing capabilities. Financial resources complementarity has a
positive effect only in a down market. In an up market, having access to financial
resources may be unproblematic, while in a more difficult market, it may constitute a
valuable asset. R&D resources complementarity has a positive effect in an up market,
indicating that organizations that have invested heavily in research are deemed valuable
collaborative partners. In a down market, by contrast, R&D resources complementarity
has a negative effect, indicating the smaller interest for promising yet uncertain technol-
ogy. Technological complementarity is not significant, which suggests that alliances may
have been driven by rapidly changing market demands that cut across the five sub-
sectors previously identified. Human resources complementarity is also not significant.
The models also show that service orientation has no primary effect and that service-
oriented dyads are no more likely than product-oriented dyads to enter alliances.
We find that alliance experience has a positive and significant influence on alliance
formation only in a down market (i.e. in Model 6). For one standard deviation, the
probability of an alliance increases by roughly 15 per cent (e4.834×0.03 ≈ 1.15). In an up
market (i.e. in Model 3), however, the effect is not significant. This difference between up
and down markets may be explained by a lack of concern for the amount of resources
necessary to manage alliances and their afferent risks in up markets. Network proximity
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has a significant impact on alliance formation in both up and down markets. For
example, in an up market, when two organizations are directly connected through a
prior alliance, the probability of a new alliance is 4.85 times greater than the probability
of an alliance between two organizations at distance 2 (≈e3.162); when no previous path
exists between the two organizations in the alliance network, the probability is about 24
times smaller than when a prior direct link exists. We also find that media coverage
matters. For one standard deviation of this variable, the probability of alliance formation
increases by 3 per cent in the up market (i.e. in Model 3). Effect size is comparable in the
down market. Finally, the coefficient for the geography variable is significant only in the
up market.
Hypotheses Testing
To test whether our hypotheses were supported, we used a simulation-based approach
proposed by Zelner (2009), in which the distribution of the coefficient estimates obtained
from the conditional logit is simulated directly by repeatedly drawing new values of these
estimates from the normal distribution. Thus, we calculated simulated predicted prob-
ability ratios that give us an interval of confidence of our predictions.
Using this simulation method, we summarize graphically the relationship between
status similarity and the probability of alliance formation in up and down markets at
different levels of market uncertainty in Figure 2. In this figure, we took, as a baseline
probability, the probability ratio of tie formation for one standard deviation of status
similarity at the minimum level of uncertainty.
The results provide support for our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 stated that status
homophily is greater in a down market than in an up market. Indeed, the probability
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Figure 2. Probability multiplier of alliance formation for one standard deviation of status similarity
Notes: CI = confidence interval; 0.127 marks the minimum level of observed market uncertainty.
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multiplier for one standard deviation of status similarity is greater for all observed values
of market uncertainty. The smallest observed value of market uncertainty is 0.127; for
this value, the highest value of the probability ratio in the up market is less than the lowest
value of the probability ratio in the down market within the 95 per cent interval of
confidence. The difference increases further for higher levels of market uncertainty.
Second, in the down market, the increase in the probability multiplier for one standard
deviation of status is positive when market uncertainty increases, but no such relationship
is observed in the up market in which the probability multiplier for one standard
deviation of status similarity does not vary with market uncertainty. This finding there-
fore provides support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted such difference in the formation
of status homophilous ties between an up market and a down market.
Robustness Checks
In addition to themodels reported here, we conducted several robustness checks. First, we
built an alternative measure of status by multiplying the number of analysts who covered
the firm by the average score of analysts’ evaluations (ranging from 0 to 1), as calculated
by Thomson Reuters in the IBES database. This measure takes into account both the
amount of coverage and the positive or negative nature of the recommendations.
We also used a different estimation procedure to take into account a potential bias
associated with sample truncation and the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Our
data cover 95 per cent of market capitalization, which excludes a large number of small
firms, including firms that are not publicly traded (e.g. pre-IPO private firms that were
created during the internet bubble and constituted alliance partner targets). Our sample
is therefore truncated by size and, because of the positive correlation between status and
size, the implication is that, compared with the overall population, our sample has a
lower proportion of dyads with low-status homophily.[4] This truncation may bias our
estimates if an unobserved variable is associated with the probability of inclusion in the
sample even when this unobserved variable is uncorrelated with our explanatory variable
in the overall population (Achen, 1986; Sartori, 2003) because a sample truncation
induces a correlation between the unobserved variable and the explanatory variable.
Further, if an unobserved variable is correlated with our explanatory variable, independ-
ent of its effect of inclusion of the sample, the estimates will be also biased. To address this
possible bias, we ran mixed logit models (mixlogit in Stata). A mixed logit model
comprises random coefficients multiplied by the explanatory variables of interest (Train,
2003). These random coefficients can be correlated with the error term to correct for
correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term. We specified a model
in which we added random coefficients to our fixed coefficients for the following vari-
ables: (a) status homophily, and (b) the interaction between status homophily and market
uncertainty. We obtained similar results to our conditional logit models, thus confirming
the robustness of our findings.
DISCUSSION
Status is an important feature of market dynamics and holds particular relevance in
uncertain contexts (Podolny, 1994, 2005). Our purpose in this study was to investigate
From Hot Cakes to Cold Feet 423
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
the contingent value of status in the alliance partner-selection process, by showing the
context-dependent nature of the relationship between uncertainty and status homophily
in the formation of strategic alliances. This study therefore sensitizes us to how different
framings of uncertainty affect the relative attention paid to status cues when selecting an
alliance partner. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of
status-based models of market interactions and more broadly for research on strategic
decision making under uncertainty.
The Contingent Value of Status Signals
Prior status research has widely assumed that the greater the market uncertainty, the
greater the role of status in the formation of alliances and partnerships, an assumption
that has been amply verified by research documenting the formation of status-
homophilous ties in the context of uncertainty (Chung et al., 2000; Podolny, 1994). In
this study, we challenge this assumption and instead suggest a more fine-grained per-
spective on the relationship between market uncertainty and status homophily, based on
the idea that the subjectivity inherent in quality judgments gives rise to different framings
of uncertainty that are linked to the context in which organizations are embedded.
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, we find that when organizations are primarily con-
cerned with missing high-potential investment opportunities, they will focus on upside
risk and thus initiate heterophilous ties. By contrast, when organizations are mainly
concerned with forming alliances that may damage their status or fail to bring tangible
benefits (i.e. downside risk), they will rely on more conservative formulas when selecting
a partner, thus leading to the formation of homophilous ties. Consistent with Hypothesis
2, we also find that an increase in market uncertainty has a positive effect on the level of
status homophily in a down market but no effect in an up market, with a probability ratio
as much as five times higher in a down market than in an up market for one standard
deviation of status homophily. These findings therefore advance the theory of status-
based models of interactions by emphasizing the contingent value granted to status when
selecting an alliance partner.
Alternatively, the phenomenon may be interpreted as indicating that actors may not
only value status differently but also interpret it differently. In an up market, where
uncertainty runs high but risk is positively valenced, status is interpreted as a proxy for
bargaining power and used by high-status organizations as a means for extracting
superior rents from low-status partners interested in gaining recognition (Castellucci and
Ertug, 2010). By contrast, when the market trend reverts, and risk becomes negatively
valenced, organizations will rely on status cues as a proxy for the quality of potential
partners, thereby limiting the probability of failure and the afferent negative signals sent
to other actors. These contrasting interpretations will, in turn, lead to opposite inter-
organizational dynamics, favouring the formation of status homophilous ties in down
markets while giving precedence to status heterophilous ties in up markets.
Our empirical setting therefore illustrates how situational elements may impact
organizations’ use and interpretations of the heuristics they rely upon in the formation of
inter-organizational ties. Depending upon which concern prevails and how uncertainty
is framed, status signals are granted differentiated value or meaning, which subsequently
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affects an organization’s decision to rely on status homophilous or heterophilous ties.
Thus, to further our understanding of the relationship between status signals and uncer-
tainty, a contingent perspective on the value of status signals is needed. For instance,
future studies could investigate the impact of different contextual factors on how status
cues are valued to determine which status characteristics matter and when they matter.
As an actor’s status is usually defined by the possession of specific attributes ( Jasso, 2001;
Ridgeway and Berger, 1986) or by the social standing of the actor’s exchange partners
(Gould, 2002), it would be interesting to investigate when attribute-based status cues are
preferred over relation-based status cues. Future research could also explore how
organization-specific factors may shape the routines that inform how an organization
deals with status signals. Although the value and interpretation of status cues is widely
assumed to be uniform across actors, it may actually vary, depending on the selective
coding of information at the level of the individual organization. Exploring the different
processes through which an organization learns to deal with status signals and how these
processes lead to different strategic behaviours could further inform us regarding the
contingent value of status.
The Role of Context in Decision Making under Uncertainty
This study also furthers our understanding of organizational decision making under
uncertainty, both by casting light on the under-appreciated role of situational elements in
framing and shaping organizational behaviour and by providing insights into the differ-
entiated uncertainty-mitigation mechanisms that organizations rely on when selecting an
alliance partner. Although prior research has emphasized the reference-dependent nature
of organizations’ behaviour and, in so doing, has deepened our understanding of the
contingent nature of decision-making processes, it has largely neglected the impact of
context on decision making and framing (Gavetti et al., 2007). Consistent with recent
‘neo-Carnegie’ research on attention (Gavetti et al., 2007, 2012; Joseph andOcasio, 2012;
Ocasio, 1997), we argue that market conditions can be construed as frames that shape
organizations’ sensemaking processes (Fossett, 2011) and behaviours, and we empirically
show how twomarket conditions frame strategic decision making under uncertainty in an
alliance partner-selection process.
Prior research that examined the responses organizations develop when facing uncer-
tainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haunschild, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) has
often conceptualized it as high or low environmental instability (Chung et al., 2000) or as
a continuum between these two states (Reed et al., 1996). In contrast to these studies, this
article distinguishes between the level of uncertainty experienced by organizations and the
differentiated framing of this uncertainty as it may translate into an emphasis on downside
or upside risk. Our findings show that being embedded in different market conditions will
lead organizations not only to differently frame the uncertainty they confront and attend
to different concerns but also to mobilize differently the information available to them.
Specifically, our quasi-experimental setting (i.e. the internet bubble and its subsequent
crash) allows us to empirically capture a shift in the way information available to
organizations is processed, understood, and mobilized in the decision-making process.
First, as previously discussed, the impact of context can be observed in the way heuristics,
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such as status cues, are differently valued and interpreted by organizations seeking to
mitigate the uncertainty they confront. Second, these situational elements also impact
the scope of signals that will be considered in the decision-making process. For instance,
although prior alliance experience and financial resources complementarities are heavily
relied upon in the down market condition, they are not significant in the up market
condition. In contrast, geographical proximity, which was considered as interesting
information in the up market condition, is considered as a significantly less meaningful
source of information in the down market condition.
These findings suggest that although organizations may jointly employ multiple
mechanisms to mitigate uncertainty, depending on how they frame this uncertainty, they
will typically give precedence to one mechanism. In a context where uncertainty is
positively valenced (i.e. framed as upside risk), organizations will tend to rely on more
open and inclusive mitigation mechanisms, in an effort to avoid missing good opportu-
nities. In contrast, in a context where uncertainty is negatively valenced (i.e. framed as
downside risk), organizations will adopt more conservative and exclusive uncertainty-
mitigation mechanisms, in an effort to avoid making bad deals.
By providing insights into the nature of the concerns faced by organizations when
selecting an exchange partner and how the uncertainty-mitigation mechanisms they
subsequently deploy differ substantially as a function of the market conditions, we
therefore contribute to a qualitative approach to uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004;
Milliken, 1987; Podolny, 2001; Yasai-Ardekani, 1986) that emphasizes how variations in
the nature of uncertainty can alter organizations’ prevailing logic of decision making
(Beckman et al., 2004; Gulati and Higgins, 2003). Future research should therefore be
directed towards examining the importance of framing on the strategies deployed to
mitigate uncertainty. For instance, prior research dealing with decision-making processes
under uncertainty has generally assumed similar effects of market uncertainty across all
market participants. Although Beckman et al. (2004) discuss uncertainty unique to an
organization (i.e. firm-specific uncertainty), largely neglected is the question of how
market uncertainty – which is common to all actors – may differently affect organiza-
tions. In this regard, further research could investigate whether heterogeneity exists in
the way individual organizations confront market uncertainty and, if so, how this het-
erogeneity can affect these organizations’ propensity to give precedence to one
uncertainty-mitigation mechanism over another.
Limitations of the Study and Concluding Remarks
Despite these contributions, some limitations of this study deserve mention. First, the
responses of individual organizations were not observed directly. The dependent variable
is an event occurring at the dyad level. Our approach is justified because tie formation
is a key phenomenon in research status. Future research should, however, also investi-
gate the behaviour of individual organizations, rather than tie formation, as done, for
instance, by Phillips and Zuckerman (2001). Second, although we focus exclusively on
dyadic relationships, organizations may form alliances with multiple partners. It is
possible that an organization’s extant pattern of ties may positively or negatively affect its
willingness to initiate heterophilous ties, independent from the context in which the firm
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is embedded. Future research could therefore address how an organization’s alliance
portfolio affects the value granted to status signals in subsequent alliance formation.
Additionally, while the number of analysts covering an organization has been used as a
measure of the status of an organization in prior studies ( Jensen, 2004), not all analyst
reviews carry the same weight. Since 1972, Institutional Investor Magazine has published the
‘All-American Research Team’ ranking, which lists so-called ‘star analysts’ (Groysberg,
2010), whose opinions carry more weight than those of their peers. Thus, the status of an
organization may be greater when it has been reviewed by star analysts than by a
random sample of analysts. Our data do not identify each analyst by name and, thus,
preclude the ability to construct a weighted measure of analyst coverage. Thus, an
interesting approach in future research would be to consider the prestige of the status-
conferring audience in developing measures of an organization’s status. Third, although
our study is not likely to suffer from a cultural bias due to the heavy US-centric nature
of our sample, uncertainty may not elicit the same responses in all cultures, and,
therefore, the heuristics and signals actors rely on to cope with uncertainty may differ.
We thus highlight this consideration for scholars when determining their future research
settings. Finally, it would be interesting to consider the framing of uncertainty among
actors in a more fine-grained fashion. Because we are dealing with the burst of a
speculative bubble, we suspect that the change of frame is abrupt and adequately
captured by our dichotomous variable. However, building a more refined view of frames
could be helpful to further our understanding of how actors may differently respond to
the uncertainty they confront. Such a perspective could be achieved by analysing the
discourses used by actors after each significant up or down market variation.
In conclusion, this study makes an important step towards developing our understand-
ing of the relationship between market uncertainty and the role of status in the formation
of strategic alliances. We develop a contingent perspective on the value of status by
empirically examining how different market conditions affect organizations’ emphasis on
status cues when responding to market uncertainty. When organizations are primarily
concerned with not missing good opportunities, they tend to initiate status heterophilous
ties. By contrast, when their primary concern is to avoid making bad decisions, organi-
zations respond to market uncertainty by forming status homophilous ties. Our results
suggest that the contingent value of status signals should be further investigated, both to
advance our understanding of the role of status in the formation of alliances and to call
for a more fine-grained approach to strategic decision making under uncertainty.
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NOTES
[1] The neo-Carnegie perspective, as proposed by Gavetti et al. (2007), has three basic objectives: (1) to pay
more attention to elements in the initial formulation of BTF that have been neglected; (a) decision
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making and (b) hierarchy, communication structures, and conflicts; (2) to incorporate advances in
conceptions of individual behaviour in contemporary psychological and sociological research; and (3) to
assess the linkages among the fundamental elements in BTF’s theoretical structure. This study is
particularly concerned with organizational attention, which relates to point 2. Note that attention-based
research does not limit itself to the importance of context or situation in influencing attention and,
thereby, influencing organizational behaviour but that it also considers the principle of ‘structural
distribution of attention’, which refers to the influence of institutions and cultural factors (Thornton and
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012).
[2] The coding of the complementary matrix and the number of dimensions is based on a review of industry
classifications and discussions with two industry experts. Of course, the coding of complementarity into
a binary variable remains partially arbitrary; however, proximate codings have given similar results.
C =
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
1
1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
.
[3] This count was done under the category ‘Major News Sources and Business Publications’.
[4] The precise reason is the following: because small firm are excluded, two types of dyads are under-
represented in our sample: (1) (high-status, low-status) dyads for which status homophily is low; and (2)
(low-status, low-status) dyads for which status homophily is high. As a result, compared with the overall
population, our sample has a lower proportion of dyads with low-status homophily.
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